Lucknow: Many officials passed through the UP Family Welfare Department between 2009-11, the period during which there were massive irregularities in the National Rural Health Mission in the state, as confirmed by a recent review by a Central team. However, one official stayed at the top all along — Pradeep Shukla, a 1981-batch IAS officer, the Principal Secretary of Family Welfare, later also appointed the Mission Director of NRHM.
Shukla said he could not talk about the matter as he was in mourning following the death of his father.
Chief Secretary Anoop Mishra said: “I have not gone through the entire report but the summary does not say anything specific about the role of Pradeep Shukla.’’
However, consider this:
There is a State Health Society (SHS), headed by the Chief Secretary, which is the apex body for the implementation of the NRHM. Its general body is supposed to meet once every three months, but it did not hold a Principal Secy cum NRHM Director, monitor of funds single meeting during this period.
Also, “The DG (Family Welfare) had the responsibility for awarding contracts and monitoring progress, but no authority to determine the vendors in most cases, as such awards of contracts were predetermined by the EC. The EC did not regularly obtain any feedback or specific utilisation reporting on the funds.”
A Rs 11.21-cr loss
In 2010, a tender was floated for buying and running 133 mobile medical units in 15 districts and work was awarded to three firms. Neither the specifications of vehicles, nor the minimum service requirements were mentioned in the request for proposal and the agreement. The operators were to submit a bank guarantee equal to 10 per cent of the total capital cost plus the first year’s operating cost, or Rs 15 lakh per district, whichever was higher. But the successful bidders requested that only 10 per cent of the first year’s cost be allowed as bank guarantee for a total of five years. At a meeting held on December 25 and 26, 2010, Principal Secretary Pradeep Shukla accepted this proposal without giving any reason. This meant a loss of Rs 11.21 crore to the state. “Such post-facto reduction in the cost of the selected operators was incorrect as this impacted on the costing of all bidders (successful and unsuccessful). Any changes in the bank guarantee should have been addressed during the pre-bid conference prior to the opening of bids,” observes the Central review.
As reported in: http://www.indianexpress.com/news/Few-checks--balances-in-NRHM-fund-management/819888/
So even as contracts were awarded without tenders and without many regulations, two important positions meant to keep a check on this were held by one man all along — a rarity, say officials.
Besides Shukla, the only other man who stayed in the set-up all through was Family Welfare Minister Babu Singh Kushwaha. On April 7, 2011, after the NRHM scam broke in the wake of the murder of a chief medical officer (CMO), Kushwaha resigned owning moral responsibility while Shukla was removed and posted in the Board of Revenue.
Talking of the way the affairs were run, the Central review says: “The management of NRHM funds in the state is primarily the responsibility of the State Health Society and the Mission Director. However, in Uttar Pradesh, the release and utilisation of funds was characterised by a diffusion of responsibility.” Shukla said he could not talk about the matter as he was in mourning following the death of his father.
Chief Secretary Anoop Mishra said: “I have not gone through the entire report but the summary does not say anything specific about the role of Pradeep Shukla.’’
However, consider this:
There is a State Health Society (SHS), headed by the Chief Secretary, which is the apex body for the implementation of the NRHM. Its general body is supposed to meet once every three months, but it did not hold a Principal Secy cum NRHM Director, monitor of funds single meeting during this period.
n A State Programme Management Unit works as a secretariat for the SHS. It is an integrated finance and account cell for NRHM activities which is supposed to oversee audit management.
n A Programme Implementation Committee (PIC) is meant to monitor funds, and is headed by the Principal Secretary of Health and Family Welfare, with the Director General of Family Welfare as member-secretary. The review’s comment is noteworthy: “The DG, Family Welfare... was not aware of the committee’s existence until briefed in this regard by the review team.”
n The SHS also has an executive committee (EC), headed by the Principal Secretary, with the Mission Director as coordinator. The main responsibility of the committee is physical and financial review of the NRHM programmes and release of funds. The committee is also supposed to implement the decisions taken by the general body. EC members are mostly subordinate officials of the Principal Secretary. It also includes two representatives of the Government of India, but officials don’t recall if any of them ever came down to attend a meeting.
So, here was a situation where Shukla controlled the department as Principal Secretary, took decisions regarding implementation of the NRHM as Mission Director and Chairman of EC, and did monitoring also as head of PIC.
Almost all the major decisions, be it the arbitrary selection of implementing agencies or distribution of those advances, were taken by the EC while Shukla was chairman. Says the review: “Executive Committee decisions for procurement and civil works construction, in particular, led to funds being routed to the DG (Family Welfare) who was responsible for awarding contracts to firms, usually as directed by the Executive Council.’’
At another place, the review says, “By arbitrarily awarding contracts to state undertakings, often at the express orders of the Executive Committee, the state did not exercise due diligence to ensure best value for money.”
Commeting on the arrangement, the review observed: “The overall responsibility for monitoring the progress of the Mission and specific high-value activities such as procurement, and civil construction lies with the Principal Secretary and the Mission Director, who are also members of the Programme Implementation Committee. For the period reviewed, there was no regular Mission Director and the Principal Secretary (Health and Family Welfare) also held the post of Mission Director.” The government started unravelling this system only after the murder of two successive CMOs. After removing Shukla, it appointed Mohammad Mustafa as an independent Mission Director — something on which GOI, which provides 85 per cent funding, had been insisting all along.
In 2010, a tender was floated for buying and running 133 mobile medical units in 15 districts and work was awarded to three firms. Neither the specifications of vehicles, nor the minimum service requirements were mentioned in the request for proposal and the agreement. The operators were to submit a bank guarantee equal to 10 per cent of the total capital cost plus the first year’s operating cost, or Rs 15 lakh per district, whichever was higher. But the successful bidders requested that only 10 per cent of the first year’s cost be allowed as bank guarantee for a total of five years. At a meeting held on December 25 and 26, 2010, Principal Secretary Pradeep Shukla accepted this proposal without giving any reason. This meant a loss of Rs 11.21 crore to the state. “Such post-facto reduction in the cost of the selected operators was incorrect as this impacted on the costing of all bidders (successful and unsuccessful). Any changes in the bank guarantee should have been addressed during the pre-bid conference prior to the opening of bids,” observes the Central review.
As reported in: http://www.indianexpress.com/news/Few-checks--balances-in-NRHM-fund-management/819888/